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Public  sector  information (PSI)  is  a  very valuable  resource  that,  back  in  2003,
the EU parliament and council decided to appraise by incentivizing its re-use via
a dedicated  Directive.  In  2013,  the  directive  was  revised  to  further  promote
the development of a single European market for information goods and services.
On the bases of the European and national case law, this article investigates the
main competitive issues that this EU law about PSI triggers.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The  efforts  of  the  European  Commission  are  paying  off:  increasingly
governments  all  over  Europe  are  opening  up  their  data,  often  without
charging for  the re-use.  This  in  perfect  sync with the spirit  and mission
of the 2003 and, in particular, 2013 PSI Directives, which both advocate free
availability  of  PSI.  In  fact,  Article  6  of  the  PSI  Directive  imposes,  as
1 This  article  stems from the research conducted within the thematic  network,  LAPSI  2.0
<http://www.lapsi-project.eu/>
* Bjorn.Lundqvist@juridicum.su.se,  Associate  Professor  Copenhagen  Business  School,  and
Senior Lecturer, Juridicum Stockholm University.
** Senior Associate, Roschier Advokatbyrå AB.
*** Partner, Citadel Consulting.
**** Assistant Professor of Commercial Law at Bocconi University, Department of Legal Studies,
Milan and Visiting Professor at Fordham School of Law.
DOI 10.5817/MUJLT2015-2-6
96 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 9:2
the general rule, marginal cost, as the ceiling, for what fees may be obtained
by the Public Sector Bodies (PSBs).
Interestingly,  lately  incumbent  market  players  have  been  submitting
claims that this change of policy is in fact illicit, harming their commercial
interests. They argue that by opening up their PSI these governments are
conducting unfair competition practices, or at least inflicting damage.
This claim merits deeper consideration: if  these incumbent players are
right,  this  could impact  adoption of Open Data policies  by governments
throughout Europe and in fact frustrate the sound application of the PSI
Directive.
The  paper  will  initially  discuss  the  PSI  Directives  and  the  interface
between the PSI  Directives  and Competition law, so to establish what  is
encompassed  by  the  directives  and  what  should  be  judge  under
competition law, respectively. Thereafter some cases from different Member
States will be reviewed and analysed. This is to show that there might be
some  disfunctionality  in  reference  to  the  interplay  between  the  legal
systems.  We  therefore  conclude  with  a  policy  suggestion  that
the competition authorities should try to establish when competition law is
applicable to PSBs, generally, i.e. when an alleged commercial practise also
is the PSB’s public task.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1  PUBLIC TASKS AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES  UNDER THE
PSI DIRECTIVE
The starting point of the PSI Directive is the notion that PSBs have been
established to perform one or more tasks: the public tasks. This is the raison
d’être for the public sector. These tasks are normally laid down in formal
laws  (like  the  Law  on  the  Cadastre,  or  the  Law  on  the  National
Meteorological  Institute)  or  Governmental  Instructions.  In  the  process
of performing those tasks – the public tasks – the PSBs accordingly “collect,
produce,  reproduce,  and  disseminate  documents.”  This  is  the  PSI
the Directive wants to catch: it wants to apply to the PSI that is produced
”anyway”,  whereby  the  public  task  is  in  fact  the  demarcation  line
for application. Accordingly, Art 1(2)(a) says:
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“This Directive shall not apply to:
(a) documents the supply of which is an activity falling outside the scope of
the public task of the public sector bodies concerned as defined by law or by
other binding rules in the Member State, or in the absence of such rules as
defined in line with common administrative practice in the Member State in
question.”
The relationship between public tasks and other (commercial) activities
is naturally linked to the perception of the role of government in society.
The principles and practices of government differ significantly between the
Member States. In some Member States, the government is expected to stay
away from the market,  while  in  others  it  is  supposed to take part  in  it,
in order to gather at least part of its funding.2 
The now amended Recital 9 of the preamble of the PSI Directive explains
that activities falling outside the public task typically will  include supply
of documents  that  are  produced  and  charged  for  exclusively  on
a commercial  basis  and  in  competition  with  others  in  the  market.  This
provides  some  guidance  on  the  limits  of  the  public  task  and  provides
a number of features to consider in the assessment of the scope of the public
task. The guidance sets out an example of supply, which would typically
fall outside the public task. Obviously, other indicators for the character of
a PSB’s activities may be found in national legislation and practices.3
The wording of the Directive makes clear that public tasks, in the view of
the Directive, can be of both commercial and non-commercial nature. For
instance  Art.  10  (2),  which  deals  with  the  situation  when a  commercial
branch of a PSB re-uses the PSB’s own PSI, sets out two requirements for
applicability: commercial activity and outside public task. If the two terms
were  to  have  the  same  meaning,  there  would  be  a  tautology.  Hence,
the Directive leaves room for a discrepancy between commercial and non-
commercial public tasks (and non-public tasks), which justifies the need for
Art. 10 (2).4
The Directive does not seek to harmonize the scope of the public tasks
assigned  by  Member  States5,  in  particular  because  this  is  a  national
prerogative.  Therefore,  the  answer  to  the  question  whether  or  not
2 See, Janssen, 2005, 12.
3 See, Janssen, 2011.
4 See, Lundqvist, de Vries, Linklater and Malmgren, 2011, 46.
5 See Proposal for the PSI Directive, op. cit., 8.
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commercial activities can fall within the scope of a PSB’s public task will
depend  on  the  way  the  public  sector  is  organized  and  controlled  in
the respective Member States. The PSI Directive leaves room for different
perceptions of public task. In some countries, the PSI Directive will cover
commercial activities of PSBs and in some countries not, due to different
roles  of  the  respective  governments.  The  important  thing  when
implementing  the  Directive  is  to  design  the  national  implementing
regulation in accordance with the existing form of governance.6
The figure above illustrates how possible activities of a PSB can be divided
into  commercial  and non-commercial  activities  and how the public  task
area,  represented  by  the  red  square,  may  cover  parts  of  different  sizes
of these two kinds of activities. Four combinations of activities are possible
and the size of each part depends on the governmental regime of which the
PSB  is  part:  (1)  non-public  non-commercial  activities;  (2)  public  non-
commercial  activities;  (3)  non-public  commercial  activities,  and;  (4)  non-
public commercial activities. The practical cases of (1) may be rare or even
only  existing  in  theory,  whereas  the  distinction  between the  three  other
fields  ((2)-(4))  are  of  great  and  practical  importance  for  understanding
6 Compare Jansen, 2005, 12-13.
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the scope  of  the  PSI  Directive  and  for  assessing  the  different  national
implementations.
2.2 RE-USE
Art. 2 (4) of the PSI Directive provides that:
 “‘Re-use’ means the use by persons or legal entities of documents held by
public sector bodies, for commercial or non-commercial purposes other than
the initial  purpose  within the  public  task  for  which the  documents  were
produced. Exchange of  documents between public  sector  bodies purely in
pursuit of their public tasks does not constitute re-use.”
Here, the term public task shows up for the second time in the Directive.
Interestingly,  the  definition  of  re-use  requires  the  original  PSI  to  be
produced within the public  task,  whereas Art.  1 (2)  (a),  as stated above,
requires the supply of PSI to be a public task. In the light of recital  9 of
the preamble of the Directive, the word produced must be interpreted as
also including at least the collection and reproduction of documents. Use of
such documents  for other purposes than the initial  purpose for why the
data was collected or produced constitutes a re-use. The PSI Directive uses
a broad definition of re-use encompassing basically any following activity
with the data, as long as the purpose of this re-use is  different from the
initial purpose.7
The  last  sentence  of  Art.  2  (4)  makes  clear  that  the  exchange  of
documents between different PSBs purely in pursuit  of their public tasks
does not constitute re-use. This appears like a superfluous sentence, since it
seems clear  from the first  sentence that  the situation  described  does not
constitute re-use. The identity of the re-user is irrelevant, but the second use
must occur outside a public task. Second use of PSI by the same PSB (i.e. the
original  PSI  holder)  within  the  scope  of  its  public  tasks  ought  not
to constitute re-use either, though this is a question of interpretation. 
2.2.1 RE-USE BY PSB
As  has  already  been  suggested,  re-use  does  not  necessarily  need  to  be
performed by private sector parties. PSBs can re-use themselves and they
can re-use their own PSI. This happens when PSBs use the same documents
in  activities  within  their  public  tasks  as  in  activities  outside  their  public
7 See, Lundqvist, de Vries, Linklater and Malmgren, 2011, 34.
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tasks. Re-use by PSBs often involve adding value to the PSI that the PSBs
have collected for  certain  users,  or developing added-value products  for
a comprehensive consumer market, that are constructed from the original
data  gathered  within  the  exercise  of  the  PSBs’  public  tasks.8 Examples
of such  commercial  products  are  custom-made  weather  forecasts
constructed from meteorological information, or market surveys based on
statistical data. The original information collected with public capital and
within  the  exercise  of  the  public  task  should  be  available  for  re-use,
in contrast to the commercial  information products and services resulting
from that information.9
A PSB re-using  its  own PSI  commercially  is  subject  to  Art.  10  (2)  of
the PSI  Directive  and  must  consequently  make  sure  not  to  discriminate
against other re-users in its charging policy or re-use conditions.10 Art. 10 (2)
of the PSI Directive states:
“If documents are re-used by a public sector body as input for its commercial
activities which fall outside the scope of its public tasks, the same charges
and other conditions shall apply to the supply of the documents for those
activities as apply to other users.”
Thus, a PSB must use the same terms and conditions on itself as on third
parties when using PSI documents as an input to: (i) commercial activities
that (ii) fall outside the scope of public task. Thus, the wording public task
shows up for the third time in the PSI Directive, but this time together with
the  term  commercial  activity.  Important  to  notice  is  that  for  Art.  10  (2)
purposes, it is the PSB’s re-use activity that needs to fall outside the public
task for the non-discrimination clause to apply, and not its initial supply
of the PSI in question.11
Even though, as concluded above, non-public non-commercial activities
of a PSB ((1)-cases  in  the  figure  above)  must  be  rare,  one can ask what
happens if a PSB re-uses its own PSI for non-commercial purposes outside
its  public  tasks.  Then  Art.  10  (2)  is  not  applicable,  but  the  rest  of
the provisions in the PSI Directive might apply. Art. 10 (1) states that any
applicable  conditions  for  the  re-use  of  documents  shall  be  non-
8 Compare  Proposal  for  the  PSI  Directive,  8  and  Lundqvist,  de  Vries,  Linklater  and
Malmgren, 2011, 34.
9 Proposal for the PSI Directive, 7-8.
10 See, Lundqvist, de Vries, Linklater and Malmgren, 2011, 34.
11 Ibidem, 37-38.
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discriminatory  for  comparable  categories  of  re-use.  Thus,  this  non-
discrimination  provision  applies  when  a  PSB  re-uses  PSI  for  non-
commercial purposes, but it is less strict than the absolute discrimination
prohibition  in  Art.  10  (2),  as  it  allows  different  conditions  for  different
categories of re-use. 
The structure of the PSI Directive is knotty whereby the term public task
appears three times. First, the genesis of the PSI must have occurred within
the public task for the PSI Directive to apply. Secondly, the supply of the
PSI must be an activity falling within the public task of the PSB holding
the document. At the same time as these public task requirements must be
met in order for the Directive to apply, the public task also functions as a
shield against the application of the Directive. As long as the PSI does not
leave the public task-area, the Directive does not apply. First when the PSI
leaves the safe harbor of public task and reaches actors outside that area,
does the PSI Directive kick in. This might also explain why Art. 1 (2) (b)
utilizes  the  term  supply.  The  supply  of  PSI  is  an  out-reaching  activity,
which is a necessary element for this transportation of PSI, from public task
to non-public task, to take place.
The figure below illustrates when the PSI Directive becomes applicable
in  terms of  public  task,  commercial  activity  and re-use.  The  red arrows
indicate  that  the  PSI  Directive  applies  to  the  transfer  of  PSI,  and green
arrows indicate that the PSI Directive is not applicable. Thus, the PSI first
needs  to  have its  origin  in  the  red square  (the  public  task  area)  for  the
Directive to apply (all red arrows start within the red square). But the PSI
also needs to leave that area for the Directive to apply (all red arrows end
outside  the  red  square).  When  the  PSI  leaves  the  public  task  area
and reaches external actors, the Directive applies. When it leaves the public
task area but stays within the PSB, and is an input for the PSB’s commercial
activities, Art. 10 (2) becomes applicable. This means that the external actors
receive the same position in relation to the public task part of the PSB as the
commercial branch of the PSB does. The external actors have the right to
receive the PSI on the same terms and conditions as the commercial branch
of the PSB. If  the PSI documents are used as an in  input  to commercial
activities falling inside its public task, Art. 10 (2) is not applicable. If the PSI
leaves the public task area and stays within the PSB but as an input to non-
commercial activities, the Directive applies, as the re-use requirement is still
met, but Art. 10 (2) does not apply.
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This way of defining the scope of the Directive is to some extent in line
with general competition law. It is only when the PSI leaves the public task-
area  that  PSBs  are  acting  as  (potential)  competitors  on  a  (hypothetical)
market. A PSB re-using PSI outside the public task, which by the way could
be a pleonasm considering the definition of re-use, should not be in any
superior position compared to a third (market) party looking to re-use the
same  PSI.12 Accordingly,  the  PSI  Directive  creates  a  level  playing  field
between PSBs and other re-users: as soon as a PSB leaves the public task
territory,  it  loses  its  “competition  (law)  principles  immunity”  and  the
absolute  discrimination  prohibition  in  Art.  10  (2)  becomes  applicable.13
Again,  though,  this  transit  between  the  PSI  Directive  and  general
competition law is a bit more complex, as the different terms used to define
the scope of the PSI Directive and to define the scopes of other competition
provisions create an overlap between the legal frameworks, whereby there
is  a  possibility  for  situations  to  arise  where  both  the  PSI  Directive  and
competition  provision  apply  and  where  there  may  be  incidents  of
disharmony. 
Under  the  Open  data  initiative,  increasingly  governments  all  over
Europe are opening up their data, often without charging for the re-use. It is
12 See, Lundqvist, de Vries, Linklater and Malmgren, 2011, 34-35.
13 Ibidem.
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in perfect sync with the 2003 and, in particular, 2013 PSI Directives, which
both advocate free availability of PSI. In fact, Article 6 of the PSI Directive
stipulates as a general rule that “[w]here charges are made for the re-use of
documents, those charges shall be limited to the marginal costs incurred for
their  reproduction,  provision  and  dissemination”.  Nonetheless,
an underlying idea of competition law is  that  transactions take place  for
remuneration  reflecting  market  price.  When the  PSBs give  access  to  PSI
without charges both on the wholesale level and in the end-user market
the principles of competition law and the PSI Directive may not correspond
or  even  be  contrary  to  each  other.  However,  it  depends  in  part  on
the definition of public (commercial) task and the size of “the public power
and thereto connected conduct exemption” under Competition law. In part,
it also depends on what weight you put to the argument: "we can provide
this kind of service on a commercial basis. Hence, the state should not make
such  services  a  public  task  and provide  the  same service  to  citizens  for
free.” Perhaps, it  is actually creates an incentive to dynamically compete.
Thus, the PSI Directive does not provide any basis for arguing that it aims at
preventing PSBs from providing such services for free. Although the policy
objective of the directive is to create markets for commercial added-value
information markets that build on PSI re-use, the other objective is to make
PSI  available  to  citizens.  It  is  important  that  open data  policy  does  not
exclude  commercial  re-users  from  the  market,  while  it  also  facilitates
a dynamic  incentive  to enrich  and improve re-users  services.  Even more
importantly,  private  re-users  can  aggregate  data  from  different  sources
which is more difficult  for PSB. In sum, open data policies put economic
pressure on commercial  re-users,  but such pressure also create incentives
for enhancing the quality of added-value services of commercial re-users.
This disharmony will be examined more fully below. 
Again it becomes clear that the PSI Directive raises questions concerning
the position of PSBs on the market and in society. If a PSB offers commercial
information products on the market, the basic data it used for the product
has to be available to the private sector on the same conditions as the PSB
obtained  them.  Of  course,  this  will  be  quite  a  challenge  in  practice,
as the PSB will have to charge itself for documents that were already in its
possession  for  the  performance  of  its  public  task.  To  uphold  this,
a separation  between  the  public  tasks  and  the  commercial  activities  of
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the PSBs is necessary.14 It is easily conceivable for a PSB to apply the same
conditions on other PSBs as on private actors. But it will be quite a challenge
to ensure that the PSB imposes the same conditions on itself as on any other
body  requesting  the  same  documents,  even  when  no  actual  transfer  of
the data is taking place.15
3. THE PSI DIRECTIVE IN RELATION TO COMPETITION
LAW16
3.1 EU COMPETITION LAW
The PSI Directive acts and EU competition law are two separate regimes. It
should, thus, be the starting point when handling an issue of re-use of PSI
held and supplied by a PSB. Both when having found that the PSI Directive
applies and when having found that it does not apply, one has to go on
to the competition provisions in TFEU in order to find out in which way
general competition law possibly complements or extends the provisions
(or lack thereof) in the PSI Directive. The correlation between the different
terms that govern applicability of general EU competition law and the PSI
Directive may be illustrated as in the simplified figure below. 
SGEIs are always public tasks and can be conducted by undertakings.
SGEIs may under certain circumstances be excluded from the applicability
of  the  TFEU  competition  provisions  (cf.  Art  106(2)  TFEU),  and  from
the scope of the PSI Directive.17,  18 The exercise of official authority always
takes place within a public task and excludes the entity in that case from
being regarded as an undertaking. Of course, more requirements need to be
fulfilled  for  the  respective  set  of  rules  to  apply  (like  the  absence
of applicable  exemptions,  provided for  in  Art  1(2)  (b)-(f)),  but  the  figure
gives  an  overview  of  how  the  terms  decisive  for  the  first  questions
of applicability relate to one another. 
The statements above are without  controversy.  However,  the overlap
between  the  terms  public  task  and  undertaking  is  more  in  dispute.
14 Ibidem, 42-45.
15 Compare Correira, 2005.
16 For a very in-depth analysis of the interface between the PSI Directive and EU Competition
law in general, and the Compass case in specific, see Drexl, 2015.
17 In accordance with Art. 106(2) TFEU, SGEI are exempted if the application of competition
provisions on such conduct would obstruct the performance of the particular tasks assigned
to the undertaking.
18 However, Art. 11 (2) of the PSI Directive states that where an exclusive right is necessary for
the provision of a service in the public interest might be permitted.
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The CJEU recently implicitly discussed this interface in the Compass case19.
The  Compass  case  concerned  the  legal  issue  of  whether  the  refusal  to
supply  doctrine,  under  the  abuse  of  dominance  rule,  may be  applicable
when  the  Republic  Österreich  (Austria)  refused  to  give  access  to
the digitalised  Austrian  Company  Register  to  the  limited  company
Compass-Databank  GmbH  (Compass)  so  to  enable  it  to  sell  access  to
or information provided in the Austrian Company Register. 
Compass would have sold access to the company register to customers
on the same or at least on a neighbouring “market” as the private agencies
assigned by Austria to provide access to this register. The CJEU found that
Compass  would  not  be  able  to  utilize  the  refusal  to  license  of  supply
doctrine  because  Austria  when  making  the  Austrian  Company  Register
available  to the public  was conducting an inseparable activity or service
from  the  exercises  of  public  power  of  collecting  the  data  for  the  same
register.  Thus,  Austria  did  not  function  as  an  undertaking  under  EU
competition law.20
The Austrian court did not ask about the PSI Directive,21 and the CJEU
did  not  discuss  the  Directive  in  any  length.  CJEU  stated  that  the  PSI
Directive in [the old] recital 9 states that the directive does not contain any
obligation to authorise re-utilisation of documents. Moreover, the Austrian
implementation  of  the  PSI  Directive  explicitly  exempted  the  Company
register  from its  application.22 AG Jääskinen stated that the PSI Directive
maystill be used for inspiration and guidance.23
Both the statement by the CJEU and the AG’s justification for not using
the  PSI  Directive  seem  somewhat  odd.24 Indeed,  it  is  unfortunate  that
19 Case  C-138/11  Compass-databank  GmbH  v.  Republik  Österreich,  Opinion  of  Advocate
General  Jääskinen,  26  April  2012.For  further  discussions  regarding  the  Compass-case,
please see Lundqvist, 2014.
20 Ibidem.
21 It seems like the court already had arrived to the conclusion that the Austrian PSI Act was
not  applicable.  See  Case  C-138/11  Compass-databank  GmbH  v.  Republik  Österreich,
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paras. 21 and 22.
22 Case  C-138/11  Compass-databank  GmbH  v.  RepublikÖsterreich,  12  July  2012,  not  yet
reported,  para.  50.  See  also  Case  C-138/11  Compass-databank  GmbH  v.  Republik
Österreich, Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paras. 21 and 22.
23 Implicitly  Jääskinen  found  that  the  PSB  in  this  case  had  produced,  reproduced  and
disseminated through the agencies the information in order to fulfil its public task. Hence,
the PSI regulation could not be applicable since the there was no re-use, only use of the
Company  register.  Case  C-138/11  Compass-databank  GmbH  v.  Republik  Österreich,
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, paras. 36 et seq. See also Lundqvist, IIC, Op. cit.
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the Austrian court did not explicitly  ask about the application of the PSI
Directive.25
Moreover, the CJEU in this case seems almost to have equated public
task under the PSI Directive with non-economic activity under the notion
of “undertaking” in  competition  law.  According to CJEU, data  collection
activity in relation to undertakings, on the basis of a statutory obligation
on those  undertakings  to  disclose  the  data  and  powers  of  enforcement
related thereto, falls within the exercise of public powers.26 As a result, such
an activity is not an economic activity. Equally, an activity consisting in the
maintenance and making available to the public of the data thus collected,
whether by a simple  search or by means of the supply  of print-outs,  in
accordance with the applicable national legislation, also does not constitute
an economic activity, since the maintenance of a database containing such
data and making that data available to the public are activities which cannot
be separated from the activity of collection of the data.27
With regard to the fact that the making available to interested persons
of the  data  in  such  a  database  is  remunerated,  the  CJEU  noted  that,  in
conformity with the case-law, to the extent that the fees or payments due for
the making available to the public of such information are not laid down
directly or indirectly by the entity concerned but are provided for by law,
the charging of such remuneration can be regarded as inseparable from that
making available of data. Thus, the charging by Austria of fees or payments
due  for  the  making  available  to  the  public  of  that  information  cannot
24 As discussed by Lundqvist, it is true that the PSI Directive does not oblige the authorisation
of re-use according to [the old] recital 9, but that can only be understood that the Member
State or the relevant PSB has a prerogative under the directive to re-use or not to re-use the
PSI. If it does not re-use PSI, there is no duty under the PSI Directive to re-use. Nonetheless,
has the PSB indeed started to re-use the PSI, i.e. use it outside the original public task for
what it was produced or supplied for, the PSB is, on the contrary, obliged under the PSI
Directive to give access to the PSI. It is the only plausible interpretation of recital 9, Arts. 1,
10(2), and 11 of the PSI Directive. In other words, if the transfer of PSI to the agencies from
the Austrian State in this case could be considered a re-use, the PSI Directive should have
been applicable. Now, it may be questioned whether a Member State, in accordance with
Compass  may  exempt  certain  PSI,  e.g.  the  Company  register,  from  the  national  PSI
legislation altogether.
25 It seems like the Austrian court already had arrived to the conclusion that the Austrian PSI
Act  was  not  applicable,  see  Case  C-138/11  Compass-databank  GmbH  v.  Republik
Österreich,  Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Jääskinen,  paras.  21  and 22.  Nonetheless,  the
explicit Austrian exemption of the Company register from the national implementation of
the PSI Directive seems questionable. Lundqvist, IIC, Op. cit.
26 Drexl, 2015.
27 Case  C-138/11  Compass-databank  GmbH  v.  Republik  Österreich  12  July  2012,  not  yet
reported.,paras. 41 et seq. 
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change  the  legal  classification  of  that  activity,  meaning  that  it  does  not
constitute an economic activity.
Some commentators find the outcome in Compass unfortunate. Firstly, it
is  unfortunate  because  thereby  Competition  law will  not  apply  to  a  lot
of the activities conducted by PSB, even though these activities presumably
would affect competition on relevant markets. 
Likewise the PSI regulation will perhaps not be applicable either given
the definition of “public task”.The definition of public task under the PSI
Directive  could  be  more  narrow  then  ”the  public  power  and  thereto
connected  conduct  exemption”  under  Compass  since  the  public  tasks
should under the PSI Directive at least be defined in the regulation to the
PSB. However, since ”public task” is the prerogative of the Member States
in the PSI Directive, the Member States can, of course, increase the notion pf
public task by including all sort of conducts in the regulation of the PSBs.
The result  of this  would be that conducts that are both public tasks and
economic activities would not be encompassed by either legal systems. 
Secondly, it is moreover unfortunate because the activities conducted by
PSBs which would be encompassed by competition law would probably
also be addressed by the PSI Directive.  A PSB acting in this area would
seldom benefit  from the application of either  competition law or the PSI
regulation, but when one is applicable the other would presumably also in
many  cases  be  applicable.  Thus,  the  spheres  in  the  graph  above,
representing  public  task  (a  PSI  regulation  term)  and  exercise  of  official
authority  and  thereto  connected  activities  (a  competition  law  notion),
respectively, would often cover the same forms of conduct. 
4. RELEVANT CASE LAW
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Below,  certain  cases  dealing  with  the  interface  between  public  tack
and commercial activity, especially when PSB engages or enters established
market,  where  PSI  is  traded,  with  free  access  to  the  PSI  databases  and
discussed. The cases are reviewed to give examples where the underlying
principles under the PSI Directive and Competition law are perhaps not in
congruence.
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4.2 DUTCH POSTAL CODES CASE28
The Dutch government has been working on a system of authentic datasets
(the so called basisregistraties) for a number of years. One of these authentic
datasets  is  the  BAG,  holding  addresses  and  buildings  (Basisregistraties
Adressen  en  Gebouwen).  The  data  held  in  this  registry  were  already
available for re-use (including commercial use), except from the postcodes.
From 1 February 2012 onwards, the postcodes will also be available for any
type of use.  PostNL, the holder of a  postcode database,  tried to prevent
this in court, but the court decided that the postcodes should also be made
available for re-use. This considerably increases the value of the BAG for re-
use. 
The authentic dataset of addresses and buildings (BAG) is maintained by
the  Dutch  Cadastre.  It  holds  the  complete,  updated  and  uniform  list
of addresses in the Netherlands, including the coordinates and information
on the  purpose,  surface  area  and  date  of  construction  of  the  buildings.
Every building and address has a unique identifier. The BAG is open for re-
use  by  third  parties,  except  for  the  postcodes.  Decades  ago,  the  system
of the postcodes was set up by the PTT, the (at that time) state owned Postal
Service.  However,  in  the 1980s,  this  service  was privatised and now the
postcodes  are  held  by a  separate  public  company,  PostNL.  A Covenant
between PostNL and the Dutch government determined that the postcodes
could  be  provided  by  the  government  to  third  parties,  but  that
the postcodes could not be used or disseminated for commercial purposes. 
The policy of the Dutch government is that PSI should be made available
in an easy and cheap manner to  citizens  and companies,  whatever their
intended use  of  the  data  might  be.  In  order  to  include  the  BAG in  this
policy, the government proposed a change to the Covenant with PostNL
in 2010,  in  order  to  allow  the  dissemination  of  the  postcode  database
for commercial  use.  After  refusing  this  change  in  April  2010,  PostNL
in December demanded an annual fee of 750.000 euro for  the use of the
postcode data within  the BAG.  The government did  not  accept  this  fee,
and terminated the Covenant in January 2011 with a term of notice until
1 February 2012. 
28 Case identifier: Koninklijke Post NLB.V. and Cendrid Dataconsulting B.V. versus the State
of the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment), Date: 21 December 2011,
Court decision: http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BU9147
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PostNL started a procedure before the court of The Hague, together with
Cendris B.V., a private company licensed by PostNL to commercially re-use
the  postcode  database.  PostNL  demanded  the  State  to  be  disallowed
to disseminate the postcodes in bulk to third parties via the BAG. 
First,  PostNL claimed that  the government had infringed its  database
rights,  but  the  court  found  no  infringement,  because  the  government
showed that it obtained the postcodes from the local authorities (who get
the postcodes from PostNL on the basis of the Covenant), and that it did not
use the postcode database, so there was no extraction or re-utilization of
the whole or of a substantial part of the database.
Second, PostNL contested the termination of the Covenant. According to
PostNL, the government’s termination of the Covenant was unlawful and it
could  not  terminate  the  contract  in  order  to  evade  the  prohibition
of dissemination for commercial use. The Court stated that the government
merely used the possibility for termination foreseen in the Covenant, and
had tried to find other  solutions,  so there was no unlawful  termination.
However, the Court did find that by already making available the postcodes
for  commercial  use  to  a  software  developer  before  the  Covenant  had
officially  ended,  the  government  violated  the  covenant  and  should
compensate PostNL for its damage. 
Third,  the  Court  had to  consider  whether  the  government  competed
unfairly and acted irresponsibly by making the postcode data from the BAG
available  to  third  parties.  The  Court  found  that  there  was  no  unfair
competition,  because  the  government  acted  in  accordance  with  the  law
on the BAG, with the principles of the PSI directive, and with the principles
of  the  new  legislation  on  market  activities  of  the  state  (which  had  not
entered  into  force  yet).  In  addition,  the  government  had  given  PostNL
sufficient  notice  of its  intentions and PostNL’s interests were sufficiently
protected by the notice period foreseen in the Covenant. Therefore, there
was no reason for the government to find the objective of making the data
available disproportionate to the negative consequences this would cause. 
The  government  seem  to  have  utilized  statutory  basis  to  access  the
postcode database, while thereafter also entering the market where PostNL
was active by giving access to the same PSI bundled with other information
under the BAG database for free, on the wholesale and end-user market.
110 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 9:2
4.3 FALKPLAN CASE29
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION
In a summary proceedings, the Dutch Court of ‘s Hertogenbosch refused to
impose  Falkplan’s  request  for  an  injunction  on  the  Ministry
of Infrastructure  and  Environment  to  refrain  from  making  available  the
national  road  database  for  re-use  without  any  conditions,  including  for
commercial  purposes.  Falkplan,  a  private  company  providing  route
planning and travel information services, claimed that the making available
by the Ministry of the road database for  re-use would cause  irreparable
damage to its  business model.  However, the Court found no sufficiently
urgent need to immediately stop the Ministry from disseminating the data.
Interestingly, although the Court could have rejected Falkplan’s claims on
these grounds without any further discussion on the merit  of the case, it
nevertheless went on to address Falkplan’s arguments and found that the
Ministries’ intentions were fully in line with its obligations under the re-use
framework  and  the  (upcoming)  changes  in  the  Dutch  competition  law.
Hence, the national road database can be used for any commercial or non-
commercial  purpose  without  any  restrictions.  However,  the  story  is  not
over  yet:  in  spite  of  the  manifestly  clear  decision  in  the  summary
proceedings, Falkplan has initiated so called ‘ground proceedings’, which
may take up to one year before a decision is rendered (with the possibility
of appeal). 
4.3.2 SUMMARY
In  December  2011,  in  a  summary  proceedings,  the  Court  of  ‘s
Hertogenbosch ruled negatively on the request of Falkplan to restrict  the
Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment from making the national road
database freely available for re-use. This  ruling is  part of a long dispute
between both parties on the possibility for commercial re-use of the national
road database.  Back  in  2006,  the  Ministry  already decided  to  make this
database freely available on the Internet for access and re-use. However,
29 - Court decision: http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BU8010&u_ljn=BU8010,
- Summary: http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Organisatie/Rechtbanken/Den-
Bosch/Nieuws/Pages...
- Freedom of Information Act: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005252/geldigheidsdatum_15-04-2012,
- Act amending the Competition Act on market activities of the State: 
http://www.eerstekamer.nl/9370000/1/j9vvhwtbnzpbzzc/vipgdlr6mked/f=y.pdf,
- Commissie Tweede Consultatieronde Vrijgeven NWB Bestand: 
www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/.../advies-cie-tweede-consultatie.pdf
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after considerable protest by some private sector mapping companies, an
independent commission installed by the Ministry examined the possible
impact on the market of releasing the data. This Commission found that
there was a public interest that justified opening up the data, based on the
national programme for authentic databases and the INSPIRE requirements
to  make  spatial  data  available  (Commissie  Tweede  Consultatieronde
Vrijgeven  NWB  Bestand  2006).  Nevertheless,  due  to  heavy  protest  of
the private  sector,  the  Ministry  decided  to  postpone  making  the  data
available for commercial use until 2009, which was later extended to 2011,
and only allowed non-commercial  use since 2007. This  grace period was
intended  to  serve  as  a  transition  period  for  the  private  sector  parties,
allowing them to adapt their business model to the new circumstances. 
In  November  2011,  the  Ministry  decided  to  make  the  road  database
freely available,  including  for  commercial  re-use.  Falkplan responded by
means of a request for a staying order from the Court of ‘s Hertogenbosch,
aiming to prevent the release of the data by the Ministry. The Court refused
to impose such a staying order, stating that Falkplan did not show sufficient
urgency for an injunction to be granted (under Dutch law, such urgency is
a  prerequisite for admissibility of parties to summary proceedings). In this
context,  the  Court  considered  that  Falkplan  did  not  provide  sufficient
evidence of the damage it would incur if commercial re-use of the national
road database would be allowed. The mere fact that  Falkplan’s financial
interests were at stake, did not justify an injunction.  Secondly, the Court
found that Falkplan also failed to show that its existence is endangered by
the release of the road database. Falkplan’s argument that it had actually
calculated  the  possible  losses,  but  could  not  release  this  confidential
information because it would harm its position towards its competitors, did
not convince the Court. Thirdly, according to the Court, Falkplan also did
not  have an immediate  need for  a staying order,  because  no competitor
would  be  able  to  offer  any  competing  product  within  a  short  term,  as
the road database would still have to be enriched with many other types of
information. 
Although the Court could have stopped here, it nevertheless continued
by stating that, in case of such lack of urgency, a staying order could only be
granted  if  manifest  doubts  about  the  legitimacy  of  the  actions  of  the
Ministry were already clear without any in depth investigation and that in
any procedure on the merit of the case the Ministry would also be held in
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the  wrong.  The Court  did  not  find  such  manifest  doubts,  for  two main
reasons.  First,  the  data  held  in  the  road  database  were  collected  by
the Ministry as part of its public task, and making available the database is
part of the Ministry’s obligation under the Dutch Freedom of Information
Act,  which also transposed the PSI directive.  Secondly,  it  referred to the
future amendments to the Dutch Competition Act relating to the market
activities of the State (and requiring those activities to be charged at full
cost), which holds an exception for providing data collected in the course of
the public body’s public task, essentially allowing public sector bodies to
facilitate free commercial re-use of such data. 
While there will  be a full  court procedure on the merit  of the case in
the future, the Court’s refusal to grant a staying order to Falkplan entails
that the national road database can be made freely available for any re-use,
including for commercial purposes. 
4.4 THREE SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY CASES
In three Swedish decisions, the Competition Authority had the opportunity
to scrutinize  whether PSBs were acting anti-competitive  when launching
either free searchable databases on their websites,  or where the prices on
the wholesale level were set to an alleged anti-competitive level compared
to the price of access on the end-user market.
4.4.1 SWEDISH PATENT AND REGISTRATION OFFICE30
In March 2012, the SCA decided in reference to the Trademark register that
no further investigation would be made with regard to a possible abuse of
a dominant position. The case concerned the fact that the Swedish Patent
and Registration Office (SPRO) from 2010 started to offer free access to the
Trademark register to the downstream end-user market, whereas customers
on  the  upstream  wholesale  market  are  offered  more  detailed  data  in
different  formats  (so-called “register  lifted  data”)  for  a one-time fee  and
then a yearly fee. 
Before 2010, SPRO had offered access to the database to end-users for
a fee, and SPRO motivated the decision to eliminate the fee with that free
access was within the public  task assigned to it  by the government. The
complaining  (incumbent)  re-user  purported  that  it  was  likely  it  will  be
squeezed out of the market by SPRO offering a competing product for free. 
30 Dnr 470/2011. http://www.kkv.se/Diariet/arende.asp?id=21326&b=1. Last visited 20140529. 
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While the SCA was initiating its investigation, the SPRO announced that
it would lower its fees in the wholesale segment in 2013, and the SCA in its
decision  accepted  the  lowered  fees  as  reasonable  (they  would  come  to
corresponded to the marginal costs) and thereby, without dwelling further
into the matter, the SCA found that no abuse of dominance was at hand.
The SCA concluded, without discussing the requirements, that the SPRO is
an undertaking in accordance with the Swedish Competition Act31. 
4.4.2  THE  SWEDISH  METEOROLOGICAL  AND  HYDROLOGICAL
INSTITUTE32
The  SCA  investigated  whether  the  Swedish  Meteorological  and
Hydrological Institute (SMHI) was in breach of the Swedish Competition
Act in a situation similar to the SPRO case above. When SMHI decided to
eliminate  parts  of  it  fees  on  the  wholesale  level  and  only  charge  a  fee
covering  the  marginal  cost  of  the  delivery  of  large,  or  cumbersome  to
collect,  data-sets,  the SCA closed the investigation.  The outcome implied
that access, at least on the end-user market, would be granted without any
charges.
4.4.3 THE SWEDISH LAND REGISTRY33
In  another  case,  from  November  2012,  the  SCA  assessed  the  way
the Cadastre  sells  refined  information in  the land register  to  commercial
private actors. The complaining re-user purported that the Cadastre was not
giving access to raw data. Instead, the re-user  only got access  to refined
data, implying that the price was too high, especially in comparison to the
fees charged in the end-user market. The SCA did not find any abuse. 
The case was decided only weeks after the Compass case, which seems
to be the reason why the SCA is not as clear on the issue whether or not
the PSB  should  be  considered  an  undertaking  (SCA’s  “preliminary"
assessment wasthat the information supply division of the Cadastre should
be considered an undertaking). 
In these cases, the SCA and the PSBs actually seem to have taken for
granted  that  the  transfer  of  data  to  re-users  for  remuneration  in  the
wholesale  market  implied  that  the  PSBs  were  conducting  an  economic
activity and should,  thus,  be considered undertakings under competition
31 SFS 2008:579. (Swe: Konkurrenslagen)
32 Dnr 800/2011. http://www.kkv.se/Diariet/arende.asp?id=21895&b=1. Last visited 20140529.
33 Dnr. 601/2011. http://www.kkv.se/Diariet/arende.asp?id=21580&b=1. Last visited 20140529. 
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law. Only in the last case, decided only weeks after Compass, did the SCA
start to back-track and relied on the fact that the Swedish Land Registry
admitted  to  the  fact  that  it  should  be  considered  an undertaking  under
Competition  law  before  finding  the  Registry  not  abusing  its  dominant
position. 
The Swedish PSBs subject to the assessment, referred to the PSI Act in
their argumentation. Both the SPRO and the Cadastre seem to have argued
upon the assumption that the SCA would at least in some way consider the
PSI Act. They argue that their service to supply more detailed information
to the upstream markets was a public task, while also the supply for free
or to a lesser fee on the end-user market also fell within their public task.
Their argumentation indicates that they were possibly concerned that the
SCA might  indicate that they are re-using their  own PSI for commercial
purposes, and treating their own commercial branch more favourably than
other stakeholders (an Art. 10 (2) situation). 
4.5 ENGLISH CASE
The  Dutch  and  the  Swedish  cases  above  concern  with  the  PSBs  giving
access to PSI without charges or too less of or no margin compared to the
prices at the wholesale level, and thereby frustrated the re-users business
models.  They argue that by opening up their PSI these governments are
conducting unfair competition practices, or at least inflicting damage. The
PSBs claimed that giving access for free in the end-market or the wholesale
market (or both) is within their public task, and also in line with the spirit of
the PSI directive of charging at most marginal  cost for accessing the PSI.
Stating this there is however other cases were the PSBs are alleged to make
use of its prerogative of defining public task so not to give access to PSI, or
at  least  not  in  the manner,  i.e.  raw data,  requested by the  re-users.  The
Swedish Cadastre case discussed above is one example, another example is
the UK Coal Authority Case currently being scrutinized by the UK Courts. 
4.5.1 UK COAL AUTHORITY CASE34
The case relates to a dispute between PinPoint Information Ltd. (PinPoint)
and the  Coal  Authority  on the  permitted  re-use  of  the  Coal  Authority’s
information on coal mining information. The Coal Authority systematically
34 See more at:
http://www.epsiplatform.eu/content/opsi-s-ruling-pinpoint-
information#sthash.D0KcM7RL.dpuf
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collects  and  maintains  certain  data  on  past  and  ongoing  coal  mining
operations. This information is used (among other purposes) in the course
of  conveyancing:  when  selling  property,  information  from  the  Coal
Authority is requested in England and Wales though standardized forms
(so-called CON29M forms). The reports provided by the Coal Authority in
response to these requests (CON29M reports) are then used to determine
any  risks  to  the  property  caused  by  coal  mining  activity.  Thus,
the information  is  commercially  valuable  in  the  course  of  real  estate
transactions.  Granting  access  to  this  PSI  is  one  of  the  statutory  tasks  of
the Coal Authority.
A number of commercial  companies  have implemented arrangements
with  the  Coal  Authority,  under  which  it  supplies  CON29M  reports  for
specific properties upon request (for a fee). The commercial companies then
use this information to enrich their own data, and sell the results. PinPoint
is one such company, which specializes in the commercialization of official
geospatial  data. PinPoint however sought a more extensive arrangement,
seeking to license the entirety of the Coal Authority’s databases, rather than
obtaining  specific  information  through individual  requests  on a  case-by-
case  basis.  It  submitted a  request  to  this  effect  to  the Coal Authority  in
August 2010. After some discussions PinPoint proposed the establishment
of a joint venture with the Coal Authority as a method for implementing
this  data  sharing  plan;  however,  the  Coal  Authority  declined.  When
PinPoint’s request to engage in mediation before the Office of Public Sector
Information (OPSI) was refused by the Coal Authority, PinPoint submitted
a formal complaint to OPSI.
The complaint related both to the Coal Authority’s rejection of the joint
venture proposal, and to the failure to grant a licence to re-use the databases
as proposed by PinPoint, which PinPoint argues was in violation of the Re-
use of Public Sector Information Regulations 2005 (the PSI Regulations). 
However, OPSI noted that re-use by definition requires that information
is used for a different purpose than the initial purpose within the public
task for  which  the document  was produced.  Noting that  the production
of CON29M  reports  is  a  part  of  the  Coal  Authority’s  public  task,  OPSI
found that the production of similar reports by private companies is not a
form of re-use but rather a replication of existing public tasks, and that the
relevant parts of the PSI Regulations therefore did not apply. As PinPoint
declined to clarify any further plans for the information (which might have
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gone  beyond  the  production  of  CON29M  equivalent  reports,  and  thus
might have constituted re-use covered by the PSI Regulations), OPSI found
that  the  request  for  re-use  did  not  “state  the  purpose  for  which
the document is to be re-used”, as required under the Regulations.
Ultimately,  OPSI  decided  to  partially  uphold  the  complaint.  While
the complaint could not formally be based on the PSI Regulations due to
the fact that PinPoint did not specify any clear intended re-use, OPSI none
the  less  found  several  deficiencies  in  the  Coal  Authority’s  treatment  of
the communications.  As  a  result,  OPSI  recommended  that  the  Coal
Authority review its communication to the public, to potential re-users and
to OPSI, and that it re-examine the original request.
It is apparent from OPSI's initial complaint findings, that TCA felt to be
its public task, to include not just the creation and maintenance of coal risk
public  records,  but  also  the  sale  of  Con29M  coal  reports.  PinPoint
challenged the basis of OPSI's findings and threatened to escalate matters.
This  resulted,  according  to  anecdotal  evidences,  in  OPSI  'facilitated
discussions', which led in turn to an OGL licensing agreement, under which
the  majority  of  TCA  data  was  released,  and updated  for  a  period  of  6
months. During the currency of those discussions and prior to the licensing
agreement being in place, TCA published its public task. The scope of its
task was extended further to essentially include any use of TCA data in the
property market. The case is, also according to anecdotal evidence, on-going
in the UK Courts.
5. ANALYSIS
The  national  cases  reviewed  above  are  examples  of  incidents  where
the Member States prerogative to decide what constitutes public task may
have  restricting  effects  on  the  business  activities  of  the  re-users.  In  the
Dutch cases and Swedish Trademark database case, giving access for free
and stating that this  is  within the public  task and even promoted under
the pricing rules and principles of the PSI directive both limit the business
activities of the re-users and encourage them to develop their services.  It
forces them either to extend and diversify their products so not be seen to
be in competition with the service provided for free by the PSBs, or to exit
the markets. 
In fact the cases above have some differences and similarities. The Dutch
PostNL  case  concerns  a  PSB  entering  new  markets,  with  the  aim  of
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increasing  its  public  tasks  in  accordance  with  the  national  government
instructions,  by opening up for  transferring PSI  without  charges both in
the wholesale  and  end-users  segments.  Here  the  incumbent  firm,  and
the holder of the PSI database, was exposed the competitive pressure from
a new entrant being the PSB. The Swedish Trademark case and the Dutch
Falkplan  case  dealt  with  PSBs  starting  to  give  access  for  free  and  for
commercial  re-use,  while  previously  it  either  charged  also  end-users  or
refused giving access for commercial re-use. The PSBs purported that their
reason for changing terms of accessing the PSI was to increase availability of
PSI under their public tasks, in accordance with the PSI Directive. The UK
CAT case is an example of a PSB alleged to have extended the notion public
task  so  to  exclude  re-users  not  by  giving  access  but  by  refusing  re-use
altogether. 
Interestingly,  the  Swedish  re-users  in  the  cases  above  complained  to
the SCA regarding the pricing levels of the PSBs under competition law and
the abuse of dominance prohibition in an effort to try to limit the impact of
the strategies  by the  PSBs.  The SCA relied,  and the  PSB agreed,  that  in
principle the prohibition of abuse of dominance would have be applicable
for the PSBs, save that they had not committed any abuse. 
The application of competition law to these cases would also have been
beneficial since thereby the PSI directive and the notion of “public task” did
not have to be addressed. Competition law could be utilized irrespectively
on what the PSBs would be considered to be their public tasks. However,
when  the  last  decision  was  to  be  handed  down by  the  SCA,  the  CJEU
delivered the Compass case, which seems to restrict the use of competition
law when dealing with PSBs and the re-use of PSI. In fact, it seems that the
CJEU limits the use of competition law so not to include bodies conducting
certain  public  tasks  in  reference  of  collecting  and  disseminating  PSI.
The CJEU  extended  exemption  (under  the  notion  of  undertaking)  for
conducts that fall under the ‘public power and thereto connected activities’
doctrine. It did include also the transfer of PSI between the Austrian state to
the agencies, and, perhaps, generally, to the transfer of PSI for re-use if that
is within the statutory duties of the PSB.
According to CJEU, data collection activity in relation to undertakings,
on  the  basis  of  a  statutory  obligation  on  those  undertakings  to  disclose
the data and powers of enforcement related thereto, falls within the exercise
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of public powers.35 As a result, such an activity is not an economic activity.
Equally, an activity consisting in the maintenance and making available to
the  public  of  the  data  thus  collected,  whether  by  a  simple  search or  by
means  of  the  supply  of  print-outs,  in  accordance  with  the  applicable
national  legislation,  also  does  not  constitute  an  economic  activity,  since
the maintenance of a database containing such data and making that data
available  to  the  public  are  activities  which  cannot  be  separated  from
the activity of collection of the data.36
With regard to the fact that the making available to interested persons of
the  data  in  such  a  database  is  remunerated,  the  CJEU  noted  that,  in
conformity with the case-law, to the extent that the fees or payments due for
the making available to the public of such information are not laid down
directly or indirectly by the entity concerned but are provided for by law,
the charging of such remuneration can be regarded as inseparable from that
making available of data. Thus, the charging by Austria of fees or payments
due  for  the  making  available  to  the  public  of  that  information  cannot
change  the  legal  classification  of  that  activity,  meaning  that  it  does  not
constitute an economic activity.37 It  seems that the CJEU thereby address
35 Drexl, 2015.
36 Case  C-138/11  Compass-databank  GmbH  v.  Republik  Österreich  12  July  2012,  not  yet
reported.,para. 41.
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the area  of  public  commercial  tasks,  and finds  that  competition  law not
applicable to such conduct.
In light of the Compass case, the national cases reviewed above should
perhaps not  have been  scrutinized  under  Competition  law.  The PSBs in
those  cases  all  claimed  to  be  active  with  public  tasks  in  reference  with
collecting and disseminating PSI under statutory duty. While some of them
clearly also are performing public tasks, other forms conduct seem to be
both commercial and public tasks. Thus, the Post NL case, where the PSB
enters an already existing re-user market by providing PSI for free, seems to
imply that anticompetitive exclusionary effects may materialise, while the
same conduct also opens up for more re-users to access the PSI and enter
downstream markets. There is also the inherent difficulty that the PSBs are
giving  access  for  free  on already established  markets.  It  creates  a  strain
between competition law principles and that the new PSI Directive actually
stipulates that the PSBs as a general rule should price below market price. 
6. POLICY SUGGESTIONS
Our  policy  suggestion  is  based  on  the  finding  that  we  believe  that
the interface  between  competition  law  and  PSI  directive  needs  to  be
clarified. At least, it is not evident when competition law is applicable to
PSBs that have as their public task to commercially distribute PSI. 
The Commission  could try  to give  guidance  on this  point  in  the  PSI
Licensing Guidelines. However, that may be difficult. An alternative could
be  that  the  Commission  and,  foremost,  national  competition  (or,  when
applicable  PSI)  authorities  are  encouraged  to  shed  some  light  on
the interface by investigating and even litigating such conduct that may be
identified as public commercial  tasks in  the area of PSI.  In fact,  national
competition or PSI authorities could be better placed to do this, while they
also could, possibly,  scrutinize the important issue of identifying “public
tasks”.  Identifying  whether  a certain conduct  constitutes  a  “public  task”
should be done in accordance with the Member States’ existing forms of
governance  and  procedure,38 and  national  authorities  seem  more  apt  to
scrutinize this issue. Similarly, since the Compass case makes a connection
between Member States’ legislation and the “state action” exemption under
37 Case  C-138/11  Compass-databank  GmbH  v.  Republik  Österreich,  12  July  2012,  not  yet
reported.,para. 42.
38 Compare Janssen, 2005, 12-13.
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the notion of undertaking, possibly national authorities are better placed to
investigate  and  litigate  whether  the  conduct  scrutinized  fall  under  the
‘public  power  and  thereto  connected  activities’  doctrine,  or  whether
competition law is applicable. 
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